# MAST Institute

Another line of defense is to maintain that abstract objects are relevant to mathematical reasoning in a way that is non-causal, and not analogous to perception. Contact our editors with your feedback. However, its central claim only relates to what kind of entity a mathematical object is, not to what kind of existence mathematical objects or structures have not, in other words, to their ontology. The tablets indicate that the Mesopotamians had a great deal of remarkable mathematical knowledge, although they offer no evidence that this knowledge was organized into a deductive system.

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The 16th century metalogic In metalogic: The level of competence was already high as early as the Old Babylonian dynasty , the time of the lawgiver-king Hammurabi c. Many thinkers have contributed their ideas concerning the nature of mathematics. Davis and Hersh argue that mathematicians find the second proof more aesthetically appealing because it gets closer to the nature of the problem. Other examples of mathematical objects might include lines and planes in geometry, or elements and operations in abstract algebra. Sometimes common sense is enough to enable one to decide whether the results of the mathematics are appropriate. The history of Mesopotamian and Egyptian mathematics is based on the extant original documents written by scribes.

Rob Reinsvold Biological Sciences and Dr. For more information, contact Lori Reinsvold. Jan 17, Where: Team projects are studies conducted by two or three students in any discipline. Contact Lori Ball for more information. Today Contact for this Page: Growth of the Institute Since its inception in , the MAST Institute has grown by obtaining several million dollars from external funding for research, and through the pre-service and in-service training of teachers of mathematics and science of grades K throughout Colorado and the Rocky Mountain region.

Facilitate faculty development Support collaborative partnerships. In addition, the amount of surviving material from later centuries is so large in comparison with that which has been studied that it is not yet possible to offer any sure judgment of what later Islamic mathematics did not contain, and therefore it is not yet possible to evaluate with any assurance what was original in European mathematics from the 11th to the 15th century.

In modern times the invention of printing has largely solved the problem of obtaining secure texts and has allowed historians of mathematics to concentrate their editorial efforts on the correspondence or the unpublished works of mathematicians. However, the exponential growth of mathematics means that, for the period from the 19th century on, historians are able to treat only the major figures in any detail.

In addition, there is, as the period gets nearer the present, the problem of perspective. Mathematics, like any other human activity, has its fashions, and the nearer one is to a given period, the more likely these fashions will look like the wave of the future.

For this reason, the present article makes no attempt to assess the most recent developments in the subject. Until the s it was commonly supposed that mathematics had its birth among the ancient Greeks.

What was known of earlier traditions, such as the Egyptian as represented by the Rhind papyrus edited for the first time only in , offered at best a meagre precedent. This impression gave way to a very different view as historians succeeded in deciphering and interpreting the technical materials from ancient Mesopotamia. Existing specimens of mathematics represent all the major eras—the Sumerian kingdoms of the 3rd millennium bce , the Akkadian and Babylonian regimes 2nd millennium , and the empires of the Assyrians early 1st millennium , Persians 6th through 4th century bce , and Greeks 3rd century bce to 1st century ce.

The level of competence was already high as early as the Old Babylonian dynasty , the time of the lawgiver-king Hammurabi c. The application of mathematics to astronomy, however, flourished during the Persian and Seleucid Greek periods. Unlike the Egyptians, the mathematicians of the Old Babylonian period went far beyond the immediate challenges of their official accounting duties.

For example, they introduced a versatile numeral system, which, like the modern system, exploited the notion of place value, and they developed computational methods that took advantage of this means of expressing numbers; they solved linear and quadratic problems by methods much like those now used in algebra ; their success with the study of what are now called Pythagorean number triples was a remarkable feat in number theory.

The scribes who made such discoveries must have believed mathematics to be worthy of study in its own right, not just as a practical tool. The older Sumerian system of numerals followed an additive decimal base principle similar to that of the Egyptians.

But the Old Babylonian system converted this into a place-value system with the base of 60 sexagesimal. The reasons for the choice of 60 are obscure, but one good mathematical reason might have been the existence of so many divisors 2, 3, 4, and 5, and some multiples of the base, which would have greatly facilitated the operation of division.

For numbers from 1 to 59, the symbols for 1 and for 10 were combined in the simple additive manner e. But to express larger values, the Babylonians applied the concept of place value. For example, 60 was written as , 70 as , 80 as , and so on. In fact, could represent any power of The context determined which power was intended. By the 3rd century bce , the Babylonians appear to have developed a placeholder symbol that functioned as a zero , but its precise meaning and use is still uncertain.

Furthermore, they had no mark to separate numbers into integral and fractional parts as with the modern decimal point. The four arithmetic operations were performed in the same way as in the modern decimal system, except that carrying occurred whenever a sum reached 60 rather than Multiplication was facilitated by means of tables; one typical tablet lists the multiples of a number by 1, 2, 3,…, 19, 20, 30, 40, and To multiply two numbers several places long, the scribe first broke the problem down into several multiplications, each by a one-place number, and then looked up the value of each product in the appropriate tables.

He found the answer to the problem by adding up these intermediate results. These tables also assisted in division, for the values that head them were all reciprocals of regular numbers. Regular numbers are those whose prime factors divide the base; the reciprocals of such numbers thus have only a finite number of places by contrast, the reciprocals of nonregular numbers produce an infinitely repeating numeral. In base 10, for example, only numbers with factors of 2 and 5 e. In base 60, only numbers with factors of 2, 3, and 5 are regular; for example, 6 and 54 are regular, so that their reciprocals 10 and 1 6 40 are finite.

To divide a number by any regular number, then, one can consult the table of multiples for its reciprocal. An interesting tablet in the collection of Yale University shows a square with its diagonals.

The scribe thus appears to have known an equivalent of the familiar long method of finding square roots. They also show that the Babylonians were aware of the relation between the hypotenuse and the two legs of a right triangle now commonly known as the Pythagorean theorem more than a thousand years before the Greeks used it. A type of problem that occurs frequently in the Babylonian tablets seeks the base and height of a rectangle, where their product and sum have specified values. In the same way, if the product and difference were given, the sum could be found.

This procedure is equivalent to a solution of the general quadratic in one unknown. In some places, however, the Babylonian scribes solved quadratic problems in terms of a single unknown, just as would now be done by means of the quadratic formula. Although these Babylonian quadratic procedures have often been described as the earliest appearance of algebra , there are important distinctions.

The scribes lacked an algebraic symbolism; although they must certainly have understood that their solution procedures were general, they always presented them in terms of particular cases, rather than as the working through of general formulas and identities.

They thus lacked the means for presenting general derivations and proofs of their solution procedures. Their use of sequential procedures rather than formulas, however, is less likely to detract from an evaluation of their effort now that algorithmic methods much like theirs have become commonplace through the development of computers.

It is a profound puzzle that on the one hand mathematical truths seem to have a compelling inevitability, but on the other hand the source of their "truthfulness" remains elusive. Investigations into this issue are known as the foundations of mathematics program.

At the start of the 20th century, philosophers of mathematics were already beginning to divide into various schools of thought about all these questions, broadly distinguished by their pictures of mathematical epistemology and ontology. Three schools, formalism , intuitionism , and logicism , emerged at this time, partly in response to the increasingly widespread worry that mathematics as it stood, and analysis in particular, did not live up to the standards of certainty and rigor that had been taken for granted.

Each school addressed the issues that came to the fore at that time, either attempting to resolve them or claiming that mathematics is not entitled to its status as our most trusted knowledge. Notions of axiom , proposition and proof , as well as the notion of a proposition being true of a mathematical object see Assignment mathematical logic , were formalized, allowing them to be treated mathematically.

The Zermelo—Fraenkel axioms for set theory were formulated which provided a conceptual framework in which much mathematical discourse would be interpreted. In mathematics, as in physics, new and unexpected ideas had arisen and significant changes were coming. This reflective critique in which the theory under review "becomes itself the object of a mathematical study" led Hilbert to call such study metamathematics or proof theory.

At the middle of the century, a new mathematical theory was created by Samuel Eilenberg and Saunders Mac Lane , known as category theory , and it became a new contender for the natural language of mathematical thinking. Hilary Putnam summed up one common view of the situation in the last third of the century by saying:. When philosophy discovers something wrong with science, sometimes science has to be changed— Russell's paradox comes to mind, as does Berkeley 's attack on the actual infinitesimal —but more often it is philosophy that has to be changed.

I do not think that the difficulties that philosophy finds with classical mathematics today are genuine difficulties; and I think that the philosophical interpretations of mathematics that we are being offered on every hand are wrong, and that "philosophical interpretation" is just what mathematics doesn't need. Philosophy of mathematics today proceeds along several different lines of inquiry, by philosophers of mathematics, logicians, and mathematicians, and there are many schools of thought on the subject.

The schools are addressed separately in the next section, and their assumptions explained. Mathematical realism , like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same.

In this point of view, there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered; triangles , for example, are real entities, not the creations of the human mind. Many working mathematicians have been mathematical realists; they see themselves as discoverers of naturally occurring objects. Within realism, there are distinctions depending on what sort of existence one takes mathematical entities to have, and how we know about them.

Major forms of mathematical realism include Platonism. Mathematical anti-realism generally holds that mathematical statements have truth-values, but that they do not do so by corresponding to a special realm of immaterial or non-empirical entities.

Major forms of mathematical anti-realism include Formalism and Fictionalism. Mathematical Platonism is the form of realism that suggests that mathematical entities are abstract, have no spatiotemporal or causal properties, and are eternal and unchanging. This is often claimed to be the view most people have of numbers. Both Plato's cave and Platonism have meaningful, not just superficial connections, because Plato's ideas were preceded and probably influenced by the hugely popular Pythagoreans of ancient Greece, who believed that the world was, quite literally, generated by numbers.

A major question considered in mathematical Platonism is: Precisely where and how do the mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about them? Is there a world, completely separate from our physical one, that is occupied by the mathematical entities? How can we gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities? One proposed answer is the Ultimate Ensemble , a theory that postulates that all structures that exist mathematically also exist physically in their own universe.

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible, --what would they answer?

In context, chapter 8, of H. Lee's translation, reports the education of a philosopher contains five mathematical disciplines:. This view bears resemblances to many things Husserl said about mathematics, and supports Kant 's idea that mathematics is synthetic a priori. Davis and Hersh have suggested in their book The Mathematical Experience that most mathematicians act as though they are Platonists, even though, if pressed to defend the position carefully, they may retreat to formalism see below.

Full-blooded Platonism is a modern variation of Platonism, which is in reaction to the fact that different sets of mathematical entities can be proven to exist depending on the axioms and inference rules employed for instance, the law of the excluded middle , and the axiom of choice. It holds that all mathematical entities exist, however they may be provable, even if they cannot all be derived from a single consistent set of axioms. Empiricism is a form of realism that denies that mathematics can be known a priori at all.

It says that we discover mathematical facts by empirical research , just like facts in any of the other sciences. However, an important early proponent of a view like this was John Stuart Mill. Mill's view was widely criticized, because, according to critics, such as A. Contemporary mathematical empiricism, formulated by Quine and Putnam , is primarily supported by the indispensability argument: That is, since physics needs to talk about electrons to say why light bulbs behave as they do, then electrons must exist.

Since physics needs to talk about numbers in offering any of its explanations, then numbers must exist. In keeping with Quine and Putnam's overall philosophies, this is a naturalistic argument. It argues for the existence of mathematical entities as the best explanation for experience, thus stripping mathematics of being distinct from the other sciences.

Putnam strongly rejected the term " Platonist " as implying an over-specific ontology that was not necessary to mathematical practice in any real sense. He advocated a form of "pure realism" that rejected mystical notions of truth and accepted much quasi-empiricism in mathematics. Putnam was involved in coining the term "pure realism" see below. The most important criticism of empirical views of mathematics is approximately the same as that raised against Mill.

If mathematics is just as empirical as the other sciences, then this suggests that its results are just as fallible as theirs, and just as contingent. In Mill's case the empirical justification comes directly, while in Quine's case it comes indirectly, through the coherence of our scientific theory as a whole, i. Quine suggests that mathematics seems completely certain because the role it plays in our web of belief is extraordinarily central, and that it would be extremely difficult for us to revise it, though not impossible.

Another example of a realist theory is the embodied mind theory below. For a modern revision of mathematical empiricism see new empiricism below. For experimental evidence suggesting that human infants can do elementary arithmetic, see Brian Butterworth.

Max Tegmark 's mathematical universe hypothesis goes further than Platonism in asserting that not only do all mathematical objects exist, but nothing else does.

Tegmark's sole postulate is: All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically. That is, in the sense that "in those [worlds] complex enough to contain self-aware substructures [they] will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world". Logicism is the thesis that mathematics is reducible to logic, and hence nothing but a part of logic. In this view, logic is the proper foundation of mathematics, and all mathematical statements are necessary logical truths.

Rudolf Carnap presents the logicist thesis in two parts: Gottlob Frege was the founder of logicism. In his seminal Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Basic Laws of Arithmetic he built up arithmetic from a system of logic with a general principle of comprehension, which he called "Basic Law V" for concepts F and G , the extension of F equals the extension of G if and only if for all objects a , Fa equals Ga , a principle that he took to be acceptable as part of logic.

Frege's construction was flawed. Russell discovered that Basic Law V is inconsistent this is Russell's paradox. Frege abandoned his logicist program soon after this, but it was continued by Russell and Whitehead. They attributed the paradox to "vicious circularity" and built up what they called ramified type theory to deal with it.

In this system, they were eventually able to build up much of modern mathematics but in an altered, and excessively complex form for example, there were different natural numbers in each type, and there were infinitely many types.

They also had to make several compromises in order to develop so much of mathematics, such as an " axiom of reducibility ". Even Russell said that this axiom did not really belong to logic. Modern logicists like Bob Hale , Crispin Wright , and perhaps others have returned to a program closer to Frege's. They have abandoned Basic Law V in favor of abstraction principles such as Hume's principle the number of objects falling under the concept F equals the number of objects falling under the concept G if and only if the extension of F and the extension of G can be put into one-to-one correspondence.

Frege required Basic Law V to be able to give an explicit definition of the numbers, but all the properties of numbers can be derived from Hume's principle. This would not have been enough for Frege because to paraphrase him it does not exclude the possibility that the number 3 is in fact Julius Caesar. In addition, many of the weakened principles that they have had to adopt to replace Basic Law V no longer seem so obviously analytic, and thus purely logical.

Formalism holds that mathematical statements may be thought of as statements about the consequences of certain string manipulation rules. For example, in the "game" of Euclidean geometry which is seen as consisting of some strings called "axioms", and some "rules of inference" to generate new strings from given ones , one can prove that the Pythagorean theorem holds that is, one can generate the string corresponding to the Pythagorean theorem.

According to formalism, mathematical truths are not about numbers and sets and triangles and the like—in fact, they are not "about" anything at all. Another version of formalism is often known as deductivism. In deductivism, the Pythagorean theorem is not an absolute truth, but a relative one: The same is held to be true for all other mathematical statements. Thus, formalism need not mean that mathematics is nothing more than a meaningless symbolic game.

It is usually hoped that there exists some interpretation in which the rules of the game hold. Compare this position to structuralism. But it does allow the working mathematician to continue in his or her work and leave such problems to the philosopher or scientist. Many formalists would say that in practice, the axiom systems to be studied will be suggested by the demands of science or other areas of mathematics.

A major early proponent of formalism was David Hilbert , whose program was intended to be a complete and consistent axiomatization of all of mathematics. Hilbert aimed to show the consistency of mathematical systems from the assumption that the "finitary arithmetic" a subsystem of the usual arithmetic of the positive integers , chosen to be philosophically uncontroversial was consistent.

Thus, in order to show that any axiomatic system of mathematics is in fact consistent, one needs to first assume the consistency of a system of mathematics that is in a sense stronger than the system to be proven consistent.

Hilbert was initially a deductivist, but, as may be clear from above, he considered certain metamathematical methods to yield intrinsically meaningful results and was a realist with respect to the finitary arithmetic. Later, he held the opinion that there was no other meaningful mathematics whatsoever, regardless of interpretation.

Other formalists, such as Rudolf Carnap , Alfred Tarski , and Haskell Curry , considered mathematics to be the investigation of formal axiom systems. Mathematical logicians study formal systems but are just as often realists as they are formalists. Formalists are relatively tolerant and inviting to new approaches to logic, non-standard number systems, new set theories etc. The more games we study, the better.

However, in all three of these examples, motivation is drawn from existing mathematical or philosophical concerns. The "games" are usually not arbitrary. The main critique of formalism is that the actual mathematical ideas that occupy mathematicians are far removed from the string manipulation games mentioned above. Formalism is thus silent on the question of which axiom systems ought to be studied, as none is more meaningful than another from a formalistic point of view.

Recently, some [ who? Because of their close connection with computer science , this idea is also advocated by mathematical intuitionists and constructivists in the "computability" tradition see below. See QED project for a general overview. He held that axioms in geometry should be chosen for the results they produce, not for their apparent coherence with human intuitions about the physical world. John Stuart Mill seems to have been an advocate of a type of logical psychologism, as were many 19th-century German logicians such as Sigwart and Erdmann as well as a number of psychologists , past and present: Psychologism was famously criticized by Frege in his The Foundations of Arithmetic , and many of his works and essays, including his review of Husserl 's Philosophy of Arithmetic.

Edmund Husserl, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations , called "The Prolegomena of Pure Logic", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it. The "Prolegomena" is considered a more concise, fair, and thorough refutation of psychologism than the criticisms made by Frege, and also it is considered today by many as being a memorable refutation for its decisive blow to psychologism.

In mathematics, intuitionism is a program of methodological reform whose motto is that "there are no non-experienced mathematical truths" L. From this springboard, intuitionists seek to reconstruct what they consider to be the corrigible portion of mathematics in accordance with Kantian concepts of being, becoming, intuition, and knowledge. Brouwer, the founder of the movement, held that mathematical objects arise from the a priori forms of the volitions that inform the perception of empirical objects.

A major force behind intuitionism was L. Brouwer , who rejected the usefulness of formalized logic of any sort for mathematics. His student Arend Heyting postulated an intuitionistic logic , different from the classical Aristotelian logic ; this logic does not contain the law of the excluded middle and therefore frowns upon proofs by contradiction.

The axiom of choice is also rejected in most intuitionistic set theories, though in some versions it is accepted. Important work was later done by Errett Bishop , who managed to prove versions of the most important theorems in real analysis within this framework.

### Imsges: mathematics online dating

Recently, some [ who? We are looking for 45 minute sessions, poster presentations, and 90 minute mini-workshops focusing on flipped learning research, implementation, or professional development. Mathematical realism , like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind.

Gottlob Frege was the founder of logicism.

European Christian philosophy Scholasticism Thomism Renaissance dating royal worcester porcelain. Mathematics and science have many features in common. In deriving, for instance, an expression for the change in the surface area of any regular **mathematics online dating** as its volume approaches zero, mathematicians have no interest in datting correspondence between geometric solids and physical **mathematics online dating** in the real world. Both Plato's cave and Platonism have meaningful, not just superficial connections, because Plato's ideas were preceded and probably influenced by the hugely popular Pythagoreans of ancient Greece, who believed that the world was, quite literally, generated by numbers. Mathenatics example, the abstract concept of number springs from *mathematics online dating* experience of counting discrete objects. Rob Reinsvold Biological Sciences and Dr.

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